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LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND

JUDICIAL SIGNALS: A POSITIVE
POLITICAL READING OF UNITED
STATES V. LOPEZ
Barry Friedman*
Positive political theory (PPT) has contributed mightily to our
understanding of the utility of legislative history in cases in which
courts must interpret statutes. Oddly, however, far less attention has
been given to the application of PPT in a somewhat reverse but
equally important area. Following a constitutional decision by the
Supreme Court, Congress frequently must determine its available
courses of action. Just as courts might apply PPT in reading the
legislative record, PPT can help the legislative branch understand
the meaning of judicial decisions. The recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Lopez' provides occasion to examine both
applications of PPT.
In Lopez the Supreme Court held, for the first time in sixty
years, that congressional legislation exceeded the scope of the
commerce power. The Lopez Court affirmed a decision of the Fifth
Circuit that struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 19902
on the grounds that Congress had failed to support the exercise of
its power with legislative findings or a record.3 In the interim

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. I would like to thank Ann
Althouse, Bill Eskridge, Dan Farber, John Ferejohn, Phil Frickey, Larry Kramer, Bob
Rasmussen, Dan Rodriguez, Barry Weingast, and Nick Zeppos for their assistance at varying stages of this project. Ann Vandevelde provided excellent research assistance under

tight time constraints, for which I am indebted.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was enacted on November 29, 1990, as
§ 1702 of the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789,
4844-45 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting the possession of firearms within 1,000 feet of a school).
3. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995).
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between federal appellate and Supreme Court review, Congress
adopted findings that purported to address the lower court's concern.4 The Lopez Court nonetheless struck down the statute, while
disregarding the post hoc findings and simultaneously suggesting
that findings or a record might be of assistance in future cases.5
Lopez thus provides a ripe opportunity to examine the role
congressional findings should play when courts are asked to determine whether statutes are within the bounds of congressional authority. That, in essence, is the question Professor Frickey addresses in his insightful article.' Professor Frickey concludes that while
such findings may not be strictly required, after Lopez a "prudent
Congress" should "articulate the judicial standard (the subject of
the statute must have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce)
and then document the satisfaction of that standard through facts
developed in hearings and other legislative methods."7 Essentially
Professor Frickey advocates a constitutional interpretive canon that
would invalidate dubious exercises of the commerce power unless
Congress has made a record regarding the nexus between the challenged regulation and commerce.
Although some may disagree with Professor Frickey's position,
I am not one of them. Congress's powers are limited to those enumerated in Article I of the Constitution.' When a reviewing court
cannot fathom how the statute at issue is the offspring of one of
those enumerated powers, it seems unavoidably sensible to ask
Congress to draw the connection. The choice belongs to Congress.
It can either make the suggested record or risk having the statute
invalidated. Given this choice, it is difficult to quibble with a judi-

4. Section 320904 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
amended § 922(q)-the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990-to include congressional
findings purporting to establish a nexus between firearm possession in and around schools
and interstate commerce. Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125-26
(1994).
5. 115 S. Ct. at 1632 & n.4.
6. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 695 (1996).
7. Id. at 720. Indeed, Professor Frickey seems to go further, arguing that for
consistency's sake the Supreme Court should require findings not only when performing
rational basis review of commerce legislation, but also when performing the same kind of
review in equal protection cases, at least when the regulation is not economic. Id. at 72628.
8. There undoubtedly are those who believe this limitation is meaningless, and those
who think it should be. As to the former, Lopez suggests the Supreme Court thinks otherwise. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.
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cial doctrine that simply asks Congress to aid courts by explaining
the less-than-obvious nexus. The first part of this paper bolsters
Professor Frickey's own argument, providing reasons why the canon he recommends is a useful one.9
The Lopez decision poses difficulties for Professor Frickey,
however. These difficulties are grounded both in traditional rules of
statutory construction and in the insights of PPT. The difficulties
arise because the Lopez Court neither adopted Professor Frickey's
canon nor rejected it. Although legislative findings and a legislative
record were arguably available to the Lopez Court, traditional rules
of statutory interpretation might have found both of these deficient,
providing an opportunity for the Supreme Court to reject what was
available and then adopt Professor Frickey's canon for future cases.
This was, in essence, the position taken by the lower court. Alternatively, PPT would have suggested the value in crediting the
available findings and legislative record despite their supposed
deficiencies, in which case the Supreme Court might have applied
Professor Frickey's canon and upheld the statute. The second section of this paper discusses how the Lopez Court rejected both
these possibilities. ' °
The fact that the Lopez Court rejected both these theories
raises puzzling questions for Congress about the scope of the
Lopez decision. Relying on traditional readings of the Lopez decision, commentators have suggested interpretations at opposite ends
of the spectrum. Some argue that the decision is relatively meaningless," while others suggest it marks a sea of change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' 2 Where along the continuum the Su-

9. See infra text accompanying notes 15-70.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 71-86.
11. See Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 15 (1995) (arguing that the Lopez decision does not signal a transformation of the federal system); Robert
F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643 (1996) (arguing that
Lopez indicates a predictable shifting of doctrine but not a major political change).
12. See Nagel supra note 11, at 643 (quoting journalists who feel we are in the midst
of a "significant transformation of the legal relationship between the national government
and the states"); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARv. L. REV. 78, 105 (1995) (suggesting that the impact of Lopez
may depend on Justice Kennedy's vote); Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Could Decide
How Far Federal Power Reaches, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1995, at 6A. ("The Supreme
Court's stunning decision that Congress lacked the authority to bar gun possession in or
near schools was a forceful reminder not only of the court's raw power .
but also of
its inevitable role in shaping the country's ongoing political dialogue.").
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preme Court actually sits is, of course, a question of great moment
to Congress and to the nation.
The third section of this paper discusses the application of
PPT to the reading of constitutional cases and then reads Lopez
through the lens of PPT. 3 In the context of judicial interpretation
of congressional statutes, PPT focuses attention upon the legislative
record to determine the "signals" being sent by "pivotal" voters as
to the meaning of the statute. With some modification appropriate
to the very different judicial environment, these same techniques
can be employed to interpret the meaning of judicial decisions such
as Lopez.
In order to demonstrate the potentially different readings of
judicial decisions rendered by traditional means and by PPT, this
paper focuses upon an intriguing case study. 'Lopez struck down
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (the "1990 Act"). Congress now is considering a piece of legislation creatively entitled
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1995 (the "1995 Act"). 4 The
1995 Act does what its predecessor did, except that Congress has
attempted by a number of devices to cure the unconstitutionality of
the 1990 Act. Although there may be little reason to think that
Congress ultimately will move to enact the 1995 Act, the similarity
between the two statutes provides a control that is useful in trying
to understand what Lopez spells for the future of the commerce
power. The implication of a positive political reading of Lopez is
that existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence may indeed be unstable.
There are essentially three points to this paper. First, the legislative record canon proposed by Professor Frickey is a useful suggestion calculated to facilitate the exercise of judicial review and
improve interbranch communication. Second, PPT has a great deal
to add to congressional interpretation of judicial constitutional
decisions. Third, a positive political reading of Lopez suggests
some possible judicial interest in doctrinally curtailing one critical
branch of Congress's commerce power.

13. See infra text accompanying notes 87-193.
14. See S. 890, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1608, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
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I.

THE SENSE OF THE LEGISLATiVE RECORD CANON

The facts of Lopez are straightforward. 5 Lopez, a high
school senior in Texas, was caught in possession of a gun on
school grounds. He was arrested and charged under a Texas law
that forbade the possession of a firearm on school grounds. The
very next day federal agents charged Lopez with violating the 1990
Act, and the state charges were dropped. 6 The 1990 Act prohibited possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of the grounds of a
school. 7 However, the 1990 Act contained no findings drawing a
connection between guns near schools and interstate commerce, and
there was no requirement that the gun have moved in commerce or
that the crime itself affected commerce in any way. Lopez challenged the indictment on the ground that the 1990 Act exceeded
Congress's powers under Article I of the Constitution. The district
court upheld the law,"8 but the Fifth Circuit reversed. 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorarite and held that Congress may not
regulate in a given area unless the regulated conduct "substantially
affects" interstate commerce.2' Deciding that possession of guns
near schools did not have a substantial effect on commerce, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision. 2
The question of congressional findings was a backdrop to the
entire litigation. The Fifth Circuit stressed the absence of findings
or a legislative record in striking the statute and noted the absence
of evidence that Congress had considered the 1990 Act as an exercise of the commerce power.' The court could not see how prohibiting guns within 1,000 feet of a school related to interstate
commerce.24 The Fifth Circuit held that in light of these two
facts, it could not uphold the 1990 Act absent findings and a legis-

15.
16.
17.
18.
miss],
power

See 2 F.3d at 1345.
Id. at 1345 n.1.
18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(25)-(26), 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
See 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) ("The District Court denied the motion [to disconcluding that § 922(q) 'is a constitutional exercise of Congress's well-defined
to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the 'business' of elementary,

middle and high schools . . . affects interstate commerce."').

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

2 F.3d at 1345.
114 S.Ct. 1536 (1994).
115 S. Ct. at 1630.
Id. at 1634.
2 F.3d at 1359-66.
Id. at 1366-67.
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lative record to establish the commerce nexus. 5 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit essentially imposed on Congress an obligation to make
findings or establish a legislative record regarding the commerce
nexus in close cases-the very canon Professor Frickey suggests.
The Supreme Court rested its decision far less on the absence
of findings. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion observed
that
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings
as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce ....
[T]o the extent that congressional
findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce, even though no substantial effect was
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.26
What the majority seems to be saying is, in a close case, findings
could help. In his dissent, Justice Souter noted that findings could
assist the Court in answering the question whether Congress had a
rational basis for concluding that the statute was within the commerce power; but while such help would be "welcome," 27 it was
not necessary because "[t]he legislation implies such a finding. '
Justice Breyer, also dissenting, felt that under the rational basis test
Congress has "considerable leeway" and that "the absence of findings, at most, deprives a statute of the benefit of some extra leeway. '29 The other separate opinions did not address the issue of
findings."
Framed thus, Professor Frickey assuredly is correct that Lopez
"provides the occasion" to address the question of the "utility of
congressional findings."31 Professor Frickey's article is an exami-

25. Id. at 1367-68.
26. 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
27. Id. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1656.
29. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
30. However, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion might be read as suggesting that
findings could matter. See id. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted, "[a]s the Chief Justice explains, unlike the earlier cases to come before the Court here
neither the actors nor their conduct have a commercial character, and neither the purposes
nor the design of the statute have an evident commercial nexus." Id. at 1640 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Had Congress included findings establishing a nexus between gun control
in school zones and interstate commerce, the Court may have found the "evident commercial nexus" to which Justice Kennedy referred.
31. Frickey, supra note 6, at 707.
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nation of that question framed against the precedents of the past.
As Professor Frickey concludes, past cases suggest that while the
Supreme Court will not wholly defer to Congress, when findings in
a statute are detailed, not boilerplate, and responsive to judicial
concerns, courts properly ought to take them into account.3 2 According to Professor Frickey, this approach makes great sense, for
determining what constitutes "commerce" is neither a factual question on which the opinion of Congress should hold full sway, nor
a legal conclusion that the courts may draw on their own.33 Rather, determining what is commerce is a shared endeavor in which
each branch must participate. 34 From this analysis, Professor
Frickey recommends that a prudent Congress acknowledge the
applicable legal standard and then provide a record and findings to
support its conclusion that the standard is met by a given enactment. 5
What Professor Frickey suggests, at bottom, is a canon of
constitutional interpretation: absent findings and a record to support
them, a court will not uphold a dubious exercise of the commerce
power. By dubious I mean, and I think Professor Frickey would
agree, a statute that leaves the reviewing court befuddled as to the
connection with the commerce power. Some cases, particularly
cases of economic regulation, will be easy ones that require no
detailed record. Further, Professor Frickey stresses, and I agree,
that findings alone are insufficient because they may be boilerplate
32. Id. at 710-11. Professor Frickey bases this conclusion on cases decided prior to the
seminal Commerce Clause case NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 4649 (1937) (upholding Congress's power to regulate labor at any manufacturing plant selling its goods on the interstate market). These cases include the following: Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
of 1935 as outside Congress's interstate commerce authority in the absence of detailed
findings asserting more than a general connection between the coal industry and the national public interest); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550
(1935) (holding that the National Industrial Recovery Act, which contained only a general
finding of an economic emergency affecting interstate commerce, was beyond Congress's
commerce power); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1923) (upholding
the Grain Futures Act, which contained specific findings supporting the nexus between
grain futures trading and interstate commerce). See Frickey, supra note 6, at 708-11.
However, Professor Frickey recognizes that the Supreme Court has subsequently upheld
legislation under Congress's commerce power absent any formal congressional findings. Id.
at 711-12.
33. Frickey, supra note 6, at 715-16.
34. Id at 716.
35. Id. at 720. Professor Frickey notes that the Court adopted this approach in upholding the Voting Rights Act in Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 157-58 (1980).
Frickey, supra note 6, at 716-18.
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and fairly meaningless.16 If deference is to accompany the inclusion of findings, those findings must be supported by evidence
from the legislative record as to why interstate commerce is being
regulated by the law in question.37
Professor Frickey grounds his constitutional interpretive canon
in the theory of "due process of lawmaking."38 Due process of
lawmaking finds its genesis in an important article by Hans Linde,
arguing that although substantive policing by the judiciary of certain legislative enactments is inappropriate, reviewing courts could
at least ensure that the legislatures have done their work.39 Thus,
in the case of Professor Frickey's proposed canon, although courts
might think that in close cases they ought to defer to congressional
judgment that a particular statute was a necessary regulation of
commerce, that deference only would be warranted once courts
were assured that Congress actually had considered the matter and
had built a record regarding the commerce nexus.
In addition, Professor Frickey supports his proposed canon with
reference to Gregory v. Ashcroft,' which itself established another
federalism canon.4 In an excellent article on the role of statutory
canons, Professors Frickey and Eskridge argue that these "superstrong clear statement requirements" permit the Supreme Court to
patrol constitutional boundaries through the guise of statutory interpretation.42 In his latest piece, Professor Frickey envisions Lopez
as the next step in the development of procedural canons designed

36. See Frickey, supra note 6, at 720.
37. An analogy from administrative law can be found in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring the agency to "examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made"' (quoting Burlington
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
38. Frickey, supra note 6, at 720 & n.130.
39. Hans Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 220-21 (1976).
40. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
41. In Gregory, the Supreme Court held that absent a clear statement by Congress, the
Court would not interpret a statute in a way that invaded core state functions. Id. at 464.
42. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) ("What
the Court is doing is creating a domain of 'quasi-constitutional law' in certain areas:
Judicial review does not prevent Congress from legislating, but judicial interpretation of
the resulting legislation requires an extraordinarily specific statement on the face of the
statute for Congress to limit the states or the executive department."). As Professor Lupu
has observed, Congress often uses the opposite tactic of enacting statutes that attempt to
legislate constitutional norms. Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Orbits, 79
VA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1993).
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to protect the interests of federalism in a procedural, rather than
substantive, manner.43 He explains that Gregory represented the
procedural implementation of the substantive review the Supreme
Court abandoned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.' What Professor Frickey does not say, although he
could have, is that the new canon may implement procedural safeguards for the substantive protection seemingly abandoned in the
line of cases commencing with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.45 and ending with Katzenbach v. McClung.'
It is difficult to contest the logic of Professor Frickey's argument, and I am not about to do so. To the contrary, an even stronger case than Professor Frickey provides for his constitutional
interpretive canon exists, especially for the conclusion that what
occurred in Lopez ought to give rise to such a canon. Therefore, I
intend to stress the salient points of the legislative record and then
draw from that review some arguments about why the proposed
legislative record canon makes such good sense.
The 1990 Act 7 was enacted into law as part of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1990.' The Gun-Free Schools portion of
the broader act was introduced in the Senate by Senator Herbert
Kohl, and in the House of Representatives by Representative Edward Feighan. Both made statements on the floor regarding the
legislation, but neither statement reflected any sense that commerce
was being regulated, nor that the members of Congress even were
cognizant that a nexus to commerce was required.49 Rather, the
entire focus was on the tragedy of guns in schools."0

43. See Frickey, supra note 6, at 721-23. Professor Frickey argues that since "Gregory
is an approach for implementing Garcia's procedural focus, rather than some interpretive
end in itself, other judicially constructed means may be forthcoming as well:' Id. at 722.
44. Id. at 722. Garcia held that claims that Congress had violated the Tenth Amendment by invading core state functions would not be justiciable. 469 U.S. 528, 555-57
(1985). Gregory obviously completes the circle by requiring that Congress actually have
considered the intrusion on state autonomy itself, and by making Congress state the intrusion in the clearest possible terms. See 501 U.S. at 460-61 (requiring that Congress make
its intentions "'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute"' (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989))).
45. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
46. 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the Civil Rights Act as applied to a local restaurant because it received food that had travelled in interstate commerce).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
48. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 (1990).
49. See 136 CONG. REc., S17,595-96 (1990) (statements of Sen. Kohl); 135 CONG.
REC. H3988 (1989) (statements of Rep. Feighan).
50. See 136 CONG. REc., S17,595-96 (1990) (statements of Sen. Kohl); 135 CONG.
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The only additional legislative history that dealt with the 1990
Act was the record of a House of Representatives subcommittee
hearing." The hearings in the House revealed that the entire focus
was upon youth violence and the problem of guns in schools. No
witness drew any connection between guns in schools and commerce. To the contrary, Richard Cook, the witness for the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, expressed concern that "constitutional authority to enact the legislation is not manifest on the
face of the bill."52 Representative Hughes pursued this point in
questioning Cook, having Cook concede that the 1990 Act would
be "a major departure from a traditional federalism concept which
basically defers to State and local units of government to enforce
their laws." ' 3
One cannot read the Lopez record without concluding that at
best Congress simply forgot to consider the constitutional limitations upon its powers, and at worst it chose to ignore them. The
former is careless, the latter would be arrogant. Both are symptoms
of a disregard for limitations on Congress's powers, which was
inevitable in light of sixty years of complete judicial deference to
the jurisdictional basis for congressional enactments. Moreover, the
1990 Act plainly was a stretch beyond the already stretched Commerce Clause.54 Even in such cases as Perez v. United States55

REC. H3988 (1989) (statements of Rep. Feighan).
51. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 3757 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 Act Hearing]. None of the committee reports on the Omnibus
Crime Bill discussed the Gun-Free School Zones Act provision.
52. Id. at 10. In addition, when signing the Crime Control Act of 1990, President
Bush commented on the overreaching of § 922(q) in violation of established divisions
between the federal and state governments with regard to firearms laws. Statement by
President George Bush On Signing the Crime Control Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DoC. 1944 (Dec. 3, 1990).
53. 1990 Act Hearing, supra note 51, at 14.
54. In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist said no effect on commerce was "visible to the
naked eye." 115 S. Ct. at 1632. The Fifth Circuit's blunt assessment of Lopez puts the
point more sharply: "we see no basis for assuming . . . that, for example, ordinary citizen
possession of a shotgun during July 900 feet from the grounds of an out-of-session private frst grade in rural Llano County, Texas, has any effect on education even in relatively nearby Austin, much less in Houston or New Orleans." 2 F.3d at 1367.
55. 402 U.S. 146, 149-57 (1971) (finding that loan sharks using extortion to collect
payments on loans are primarily controlled by organized crime with a substantially adverse
effect on interstate commerce).
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and Wickard v. Filburn," the connection between commerce and
the regulated activity was somewhat obvious and articulable.
This discussion of the 1990 Act and its legislative history
suggests a good reason for Professor Frickey's legislative record
canon. The canon rests on the difficult-to-refute logic that if judges
are asked to enforce a staiute upon which the nexus to commerce
is not obvious, it is not asking too much for Congress to establish
that nexus in the legislative record. Despite this good sense, Professor Frickey's article fails to develop adequately the rationale for
the legislative record canon.
Indeed, the least promising rationale for the canon is one that
perhaps flows most directly from part of Professor Frickey's reasoning. As explained above, Professor Frickey relies on the theory
of due process of lawmaking, 7 raising the question of why it
makes any sense to require process out of Congress before it enacts legislation. One obvious reason is to promote congressional
deliberation, in the hope that such deliberation will forestall the
enactment of unconstitutional laws. This rationale rests on some
overly optimistic assumptions about the conduct of members of
Congress, a point that seems all too clear in this case. The 1990
Act represented little more than get-tough-on-crime rhetoric that is
certainly valuable in election campaigns, but good for little else. It
is highly dubious that the 1990 Act was designed to, or was likely
to, do anything to address the very real problem of guns in
schools s Public choice theory suggests that members of Congress
will rush to enact this type of legislation, 9 making the value of
congressional consideration, as well as the broad principle of deference, doubtful.

56. 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (finding that one farmer's contribution to the demand for
wheat substantially affects interstate commerce when considered in context of the aggregate of wheat farmers making similar contributions).
57. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
58. The arguments for the exercise of national or state power are catalogued and debated in David Shapiro's concise and masterly volume FEDERAL.SM: A DIALOGuE (1995).
The reasons for retaining authority in the states are set out in Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founder's Design, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 1484 (1987). It is
difficult, with these catalogues in hand, for anyone to conclude that it makes sense to
regulate the problems of guns in schools from Washington, D.C., especially when that
regulation is a criminal law.
59. See Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the
Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 14-23 (1991) (discussing, although
ultimately discounting, the "re-election maximizer model" prevalent in public choice theory).
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Despite this, the legislative record canon serves useful purposes. Perhaps foremost among them is the fact that absent such a
legislative record, asking the courts to uphold this statute is a total
abdication of judicial review. The point can be made simply by
examining Justice Souter's dissenting opinion. According to Justice
Souter, no findings were necessary because such findings were
implicit in the enactment of the statute.' While it may be unnecessary to assume Congress intentionally disregarded limitations on
its power, upholding a dubious statute without a record accords too
much credit to Congress and too little to the role of judicial review. As Justice Souter recognizes, the reason for the rational basis
test is deference to Congress's judgment about what legislation is
necessary in the interest of interstate commerce. 6' But to defer to
implicit findings is to defer to nothing. In other words, absent
findings, there is nothing to defer to other than the fact that Congress obviously wanted to pass a particular act. If this deference is
what Justice Souter has in mind, why engage in judicial review at
all?
An ironic response to this argument is that even absent findings, courts still could determine for themselves whether commerce
is substantially affected by the regulation. This answer is ironic
because Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justice Souter, raises the
"institutional competence" argument: courts should defer to
Congress's judgment that something substantially affects commerce
"because the determination requires an empirical judgment of a
kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with
accuracy."62 I think this is an old saw, and one that needs inspection for rust,63 but assume for the moment that Justice Breyer is
correct. Is not asking the Supreme Court to look for a rational

60. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1656 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The legislation implies such a
finding, and there is no reason to entertain claims that Congress acted ultra vires intentionally.").
61. Id. at 1653 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (recognizing that "deference [to legislative policy
judgments on commercial regulation] . . . became articulate in the standard of rationality
review").
62. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J.,dissenting).
63. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitations of Statutes: Strategic Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 569-70 (1992) (explaining how the institutional competence argument rests on a notion of common good that may be unrealistic in a pluralist
society). See generally Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a
Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 366 (1984) (arguing that courts
can and should take into account the most competent institutional decisionmaker when
rendering judgment).
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basis in the absence of a legislative record asking the Court to do
precisely what Justice Breyer suggests courts lack the competence
to do? Lest the point require demonstration, Justice Breyer's opinion provided it. After taking the majority to task for claiming
expertise as to what constitutes commerce, Justice Breyer demonstrated the very expertise he claims the courts lack by arguing that
guns near schools affect commerce."
Although courts may be competent to develop the commerce
nexus, the question is whether courts should defer to Congress on
the constitutional question when Congress has failed to consider the
question at all. Lopez presents the question sharply. Congress went
to the trouble of making a record regarding the problem of youth
violence, either because it thought such a record necessary or because making the record provided good publicity. Yet, the Lopez
record is devoid of witnesses establishing the nexus between guns
in schools and commerce.' In similar hearings in other contexts,
however, Congress has been attentive to the problem of establishing a nexus with an enumerated power.'
The possible reasons for neglect in this case seem limited: the
nexus was so obvious no one felt the need to address it, the nexus
was so problematic Congress did not attempt to make the case, or
Congress simply failed to consider limitations on its power. Given
the history of the case, the first option is unlikely. In either of the
other situations, deferring to Congress's judgment simply would be
a meaningless act. In close cases deference ought to require a
record as to what exactly the court is deferring. Absent such a
record, it is difficult to see the basis for deference, other than simply to assume that Congress has a constitutional basis for whatever
it does. If this is the case, again, what purpose is served by judicial review?
Yet another reason for the legislative record canon finds its
basis in recognizing, as does Professor Frickey, that giving content

64. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993: Hearings on S.
636 Senate Labor and Human Resources Comm., 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. 16-17 (1993)
(Attorney General Janet Reno and Professor Laurence Tribe testified that Congress has
authority to enact the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993 under the
Commerce Clause); Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 90, 95-97, 103, 113-17 (1991)
(Professors Burt Neubome and Cass Sunstein testified that Congress has the authority to
enact the Violence Against Women Act under the Commerce Clause).
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to the meaning of the commerce power is a shared endeavor between Congress and the courts. What constitutes commerce that
Congress may regulate is not obvious on the face of the Constitution, and history suggests original understandings are not going to
resolve the question. Only Justice Thomas suggests that we should
return to old definitions,67 a view that is unlikely to gamer even
one more vote. Moreover, Professor Frickey notes that the meaning
of commerce is not a question peculiarly within the domain of the
Congress or the Supreme Court. 68 Our traditional view of the process would give the Supreme Court the last word on the applicable
legal test and perhaps whether any statute is within the test, but
initially the Supreme Court must rely on Congress to determine
what modem necessities suggest as to the definition of commerce.
In light of the shared task of defining commerce, the legislative
record canon demands only that Congress not abdicate its own
constitutional responsibilities. Professor Frickey argues that the
post-1937 switch in the interpretation of commerce resulted from
an educational process launched by Congress. 69 I am not sure the
educational process was precisely the one Professor Frickey describes, but Professor Frickey assuredly is correct that Congress
will bring insight to the question of what constitutes interstate
commerce given a rapidly changing world. Just as the Court ought
not to defer to nothing, the Court should defer to considered judgment.
The necessity of congressional participation is all the more
apparent when one considers that as the meaning of commerce
changes over time, the Supreme Court is thrust into the awkward
position of having to define and delimit that change. The judicial
definition of commerce ought not to be simply an ad hoc list of
whatever project Congress chooses to pursue at the moment. The
judicial process at least ought to attempt to develop generalized
principles of when a constitutionally granted power might be exer-

67. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642-51 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the "substantial effects" test employed by the Supreme Court to determine what constitutes interstate
commerce).
68. See Frickey, supra note 6, at 716 ("[P]rudence suggests that there should be an
intermediate ground between judicial and congressional monopoly on constitutional interpretation, especially on questions of congressional power.").
69. See id. at 711 ("The larger lesson of the New Deal Supreme Court, though, is that
a thorough, sustained effort of factual reeducation . . . may, in time, reorient the thinking
of the judiciary sufficient to work an evolution in constitutional law. That, . . . is what
the 'switch in time' was all about.").
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cised. Suppose the Supreme Court truly wished to act deferentially
but could not understand how regulating guns in schools fell within
pre-existing general definitions of commerce. Refashioning the
generalization, the legal test, requires some understanding beyond
simply adding "guns near schools" to the list. A legislative record
and findings would significantly assist the Supreme Court in the
job that properly is its own, refashioning the applicable test.
Finally, the legislative record canon serves to notify Congress
that the Supreme Court will take seriously its job of interpreting
the Constitution, while at the same time according Congress the
deference it deserves." Call this the gentle in terrorem effect.
Lopez itself stands as testament that absent some exercise of power
on the Court's part, Congress will get sloppy or overly bold in the
exercise of its powers. One answer, which almost no one suggests
is the correct one, is for the Supreme Court to become more aggressive in striking down congressional enactments. A gentler way
to achieve a similar impact is for the Supreme Court to strike
enactments only when Congress fails to do its own job.
II.

LOPEZ'S SIDESTEPPING OF THE LEGISLATIVE RECORD CANON

Despite the good sense of Professor Frickey's proposed canon
and the excellent support that he offers for it, Lopez proves to be
an awkward springboard for discussing the legislative record canon.
Why? Because Lopez did not apply the canon Professor Frickey
proposes. Rather, Lopez was quite plainly a decision resting squarely on the merits. The Lopez Court did not say that absent a legislative record, it would not sustain the statute as a valid exercise of
the commerce power. Instead, it stated that "[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the
possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. We
hold that the Act exceeds the authority of Congress."7'
My point is more than simply saying Lopez was a decision on
the merits, and that in reaching the merits the Lopez Court was
silent as to the canon. This is something Professor Frickey knows
full well.' As I read Lopez, the Supreme Court not only failed to

70. I thank Bill Eskridge for making this point to me.
71. 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
72. See Frickey, supra note 6, at 697-98. Professor Frickey's assignment was to write
about legislative findings, and the canon he proposes is a result of that assignment. But
Professor Frickey is well aware that the Lopez Court sidestepped the findings question.
Thus, he suggests that his proposed canon "may be forthcoming," not that it actually was
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remand for congressional findings and a record, it more pointedly
said that it did not even care what such a record might contain.'
In another case, the Supreme Court may adopt Professor Frickey's
canon, but what is important to the point I want to make is that
Lopez was a decision squarely on the merits. In other words, regardless of what findings Congress had adopted, the Lopez Court
would not have upheld the regulation of guns near schools as an
exercise of the commerce power.
Had the Supreme Court been interested in pursuing the canonical approach, it did not have far to look for a model. This was
precisely the course taken by the Fifth Circuit: "Where Congress
has made findings, formal or informal, that regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the courts must defer 'if
there is any rational basis for' the finding .... Practically speaking, such findings almost always end the matter."' 4 On the other
hand, the Fifth Circuit continued,
[c]ourts cannot properly perform their duty to determine if
there is any rational basis for a Congressional finding if
neither the legislative history nor the statute itself reveals
any such relevant finding. And, in such a situation there is
nothing to indicate that Congress itself consciously fixed,
as opposed to simply disregarded, the boundary line between the commerce power and the reserved power of the
states."
This is precisely the argument made above.
Not only did the Supreme Court fail to follow the Fifth
Circuit's approach, it went out of its way to disregard the available
record and findings. As for a record, Justice Breyer accumulated a
pile of materials in the appendix to his dissent.76 As for findings,
shortly before the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Lopez,
Congress adopted findings tying the 1990 Act to interstate com-

adopted. Id. at 722.
73. The Court stated that "to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce . . . they are lacking here." 115 S. Ct. at 1632. In a footnote the Court
acknowledged Congress's enactment of post hoc findings, but simply dismissed those findings, stating, "[t]he Government does not rely upon these subsequent findings as a substitute for the absence of findings in the first instance." Id. at 1632 n.4.
74. 2 F.3d 1342, 1363 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 1363-64 (footnote omitted).
76. See 115 S. Ct. at 1665-71.
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merce.' Yet, in rendering its decision, the Court considered neither of these.78
There arguably was some reason for the Supreme Court to
have viewed both the findings and the prior record skeptically. A
traditional view of legislative materials provides ample support for
such skepticism. For example, courts generally, and the Rehnquist
Court particularly, have been reluctant to rely upon post hoc legislative history.79 The problem is compounded where, as here, the
Congress providing the after-the-fact evidence is not even the same
Congress that passed the statute. Well-recognized difficulties with
the intentionalist inquiry multiply in the case of a subsequent Congress. Professor Frickey seems to view the findings in this way,
explaining that "[t]he Solicitor General did not contend that these
later findings could operate nunc pro tunc, instead making the
more defensible argument that the post hoc findings simply added
evidence to support the rational basis for the nexus with commerce.""° The Court apparently agreed with this "more defensible"
position, sweeping the Solicitor General's position into a footnote,
along with the findings, and leaving them both there to suffer in
neglect.8 ' Similarly, both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court
decisions demonstrated a reluctance to rely upon a legislative record pieced together from prior congressional enactments. Relying
upon a traditional approach to the use of legislative history, the
Supreme Court might have discounted both the post hoc findings
and the stitched-together record and then adopted Professor
Frickey's canon for future cases, suggesting some appropriately
expressed concern for the views of Congress.
Alternatively, there was reason to credit both the post hoc findings and the legislative record, an approach PPT might have counseled. Although reliance upon post hoc findings may be controversial in some situations, this was not one of them. Typically, inter-

77. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125-26 (1994).
78. As to the findings, see 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32, where the Court held that there was
an inadequate demonstration of a connection between the Act and interstate commerce.
The record assembled by Justice Breyer was dismissed as proving too much. 115 S. Ct.
at 1632-33 ("Justice Breyer's rationale lacks any real limits.").
79. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Post-Enactment Legislative Signals, 57 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 79, 83-85 (1994) (discussing how doctrines of statutory interpretation traditionally have been suspicious of subsequent legislative history).
80. Frickey, supra note 6, at 705.
81. See 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.4.
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preters of statutes are disdainful of after-the-fact legislative history
because it is used to show Congress's intent in passing a statute,
but actually provides limited utility in discovering such intent of
the enacting Congress. 2 However, in Lopez these findings were
not offered to show intent, but rather for the entirely legitimate
purpose of establishing a connection between the legislation and
the commerce power. Intent has little, if any, place in this inquiry.
The relevant question is whether what Congress has regulated was
properly within the commerce power. If the enacting Congress can
make this showing after the fact, or if a subsequent Congress can
make it, why should the timing of the showing matter?
Similar analysis is applicable to the overpowering record assembled by Justice Breyer. Not only did Justice Breyer do
Congress's work, he did it well. Justice Breyer demonstrated that
ample support existed in prior legislative history for the nexus he
believed existed between the regulation of guns near schools and
interstate commerce. Even if all the information was not in prior
congressional hearings, it was in the public domain. Again, if the
inquiry were of Congress's intent in passing this particular statute,
we might properly be skeptical of deducing that intent from bits
and pieces of prior hearings, many disconnected from the work of
the present Congress. But that is not the inquiry. The question is
whether an articulable relationship between commerce and the
regulation Congress enacted exists. The evidence Justice Breyer
compiled surely addresses that question.
Insights from PPT underscore the utility of the post hoc findings and legislative record. PPT suggests that if the Supreme Court
does not want its interpretation overridden, post hoc legislative
history can serve as a useful signal of the sentiments of the present
Congress."3 Admittedly, Lopez is a constitutional decision, and so
an immediate congressional override is unlikely. But Lopez also is
a decision rendered very much against the backdrop of the trouble
the Court bought itself in 1937 by striking legislative enactments

82. See Eskridge, supra note 79, at 79 ("Subsequent legislative history has little or no
formal relevance to original legislative intent or statutory plain meaning and is accordingly
viewed with suspicion under traditional doctrines of statutory interpretation.").
83. See id. at 79-80, 83-85 (describing how the Burger Court was attentive to legislative signals and avoided being overruled, while the Rehnquist Court was inattentive and
had its decisions overturned by Congress); Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory
of Legislative Intent, 57 LAw & CONTFMP. PROBS. 51, 74 (1994) ("The main thrust of
this argument is that related legislative history, subsequent to enactment, should not be
ignored by the Court. In fact, it should take precedence.").
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on Commerce Clause grounds.84 At the least, the Supreme Court
might have understood the post hoe findings to suggest the importance Congress attached to the legislation. Similarly, although the
material assembled by Justice Breyer did not speak directly to the
legislation at hand, it served two vital purposes. First, it demonstrated Congress's awareness of the connection between education
and economic competitiveness. Second, it showed Congress's deep
concern about guns in schools hindering the educational process.
Disregarding the post hoc findings after Congress adopted them
suggests that the Court did not care how attached Congress was to
this legislation. The same is true with regard to the record assembled by Justice Breyer. In the case of both the findings and Justice
Breyer's record, the evidence proved too much." As the Court
stated, "tlo uphold the Government's contentions here, we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause
to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."86
What troubled the Lopez majority was the slippery slope, a concern
heightened but not addressed by the record Justice Breyer assembled.
The Supreme Court's disregard of available findings and a
record suggests that it had no intention of upholding a law like
this, whatever the state of the record. That is quite a strong statement, indeed quite a stronger one than the legislative record canon
would suggest. The implications of the statement are, however,
unclear. If Lopez was a statement that the 1990 Act would have
been unconstitutional regardless of the legislative record, after
Lopez the important question is what role the Supreme Court's
decision should play in any further legislative activity in this area.
Professor Frickey envisions a dialogue between the Supreme Court
and Congress regarding the limits of the commerce power. The
decision actually reached in Lopez raises difficult and important

84. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1652-57 (Souter, 3., dissenting) (discussing how the majority is repeating mistakes of past). The dissenting opinion is full of ominous statements
such as "[t]here is no reason to expect the lesson would be different another time." Id. at
1655 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
85. With regard to the findings, even Justice Souter makes this point. while he disagrees perhaps with the Court's failure to consider the findings, he does not find them
very helpful either, for the findings "go no further than expressing what is obviously
implicit in the substantive legislation, at such a conclusory level of generality as to add
virtually nothing to the record." Id. at 1656 n.2 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
86. Id. at 1634.
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questions about the appropriate next move in that dialogue by the
political branches.
III.

POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL SIGNALING: THE
IMPORT OF LOPEZ

PPT offers valuable insights concerning the interaction among
institutions of government. PPT presumes that institutions, or at
least institutional actors, have policy preferences and that political
institutions act rationally in a manner calculated to advance those
preferences." PPT also recognizes that institutional interaction is a
sequential process through which institutions reach an equilibrium
among competing preferences." Much of the contribution of PPT
to legal scholarship has been in the realm of judicial/congressional/executive interaction regarding the interpretation
of statutes. PPT scholars have devoted substantial energy to describing the interactions of players in the statutory interpretation
game as the branches of government act to achieve the preferred
result without being overridden by another branch. 9 In addition,
PPT has contributed great insight into the value of legislative history as a signaling device to the judiciary about the preferences of
the legislative branch.' One such insight already discussed here is

87. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the
Nineties, 80 GEo. L.J. 457, 462 (1992) (defining PPT as a collection "of non-normative,
rational choice theories of political institutions" (emphasis omitted)); Daniel B. Rodriguez,
The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 93 (1994)
("Positive theory's core maxim of judicial discretion is that a court will decide with reference to the likelihood that its decision will be reversed by another political institution."
(footnote omitted)).
88. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REv. 26, 30-33 (1994).
89. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 372-89 (1991) (describing interaction of branches of
federal government in statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEo. L.J. 523, 527 (1992) (analyzing Article I, Section
7 as a "sequential game" consisting of interactions among the branches based on their
individual preferences); Eskridge and Frickey, supra note 88, at 39-41 (describing "signalling" as a means of communication among institutions that resolve disputes without open,
destructive conflict); Schwartz et al., supra note 83, at 55-59, 71-74 (1994) (discussing the
"signalling model" in relation to statutory interpretation and the interaction among federal
branches).
90. See Eskridge, supra note 79, at 76 (analyzing post-enactment signals); McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3 (1994) [hereinafter McNollgast, Legislative Intent] (proposing the use of PPT as a descriptive model of the legislative process in order to clarify
statutory intent); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statu-
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PPT's unique contribution to the understanding of the utility of
post-enactment legislation.
Although relatively extensive commentary on the utility of PPT
to judicial/congressional interaction in statutory cases exists, there
is far less commentary on congressional reaction to judicial decisions in constitutional cases. 9' At least one reason for this is
readily apparent. PPT sees institutional interaction as a sequential
movement toward equilibrium. Although "[a] consequence of sequence is that each institution has trumping power,"' in constitutional cases, the role of the Supreme Court as "ultimate arbiter ' 93
theoretically imposes limits on the responses of other institutional
players. The widely accepted doctrine of judicial review dictates
that once the judiciary has spoken as to the constitutional invalidity
of a statutory scheme, constitutional amendment is required to
overcome the judicial interpretation.94 Given the enormous barrier
to constitutional amendment, the Supreme Court can discount this
possibility heavily and ignore entirely the potential congressional
response. Of course, this overstates matters because Congress has a
range of possible options to punish the Supreme Court, including
impeachment, jurisdiction stripping and budget curtailment.9'

tory Interpretation, 80 GEo. W. 705, 706 (1992) [hereinafter McNollgast, Positive Canons] (advocating the use of PPT to attain a clearer understanding of statutory intent);
Schwartz et al., supra note 83, at 52-55, 73-74 (arguing that subsequent legislative history
should not be ignored by the Court).
91. A notable exception is Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The Political Economy of
Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan, 12
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1992). Gely and Spiller examine the conditions under which
the Supreme Court may impose its policy preferences on the Constitution without risking
overruling by constitutional amendment.
92. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 88, at 30.
93. See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron
Revisited, 1982 U. IM. L. REV. 387, 387-88 (describing how the Supreme Court adopted
the position in Cooper that its pronouncements represented the "supreme law of the
land").
94. See Gely & Spiller, supra note 91, at 45 ("[T]he reversal of a Supreme Court
constitutional decision requires an explicit constitutional amendment.....); GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTONAL LAW 72 (2d ed. 1991) ("The most straightforward way
for the people to respond to a Supreme Court decision with which they disagree is to
amend the Constitution."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Nonsupreme Court, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1121, 1124 (1993) ("The judicial supremacist vision of the Court . . .has prevailed
ever since Hamilton in Federalist 78 first located the Supreme Court atop a 'hierarchical
pyramid' within the national government." (footnote omitted)).
95. See generally STONE Er AL., supra note 94, at 72-77 (discussing means by which
Congress can respond to Supreme Court rulings as alternatives to constitutional amendments). McNollgast adds to the list the packing of the lower courts. McNollgast, Politics
and the Courts: A Positive Theory of JudicialDoctrine and The Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL.
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These moves tend to be reserved for an entire course of conduct
by the judiciary, however, and are not generally deemed an appropriate response to any given case. Thus, in the constitutional context, the space in which the Supreme Court can simply impose its
will seems substantial.
PPT is valuable, however, because the traditional view of constitutional adjudication understates the amount of interbranch communication in constitutional cases. Commentators have written
extensively about the dialogue between the branches in the constitutional realm. 9 6 My own view is that there are many ways in
which even in constitutional cases the Supreme Court leaves the
door open to the expression of views by other branches. Professor
Frickey makes just this point regarding the interpretation of the
commerce power, arguing that through a gradual process of education Congress can direct the Court toward broader and different
interpretations of the commerce power.97 Using Lopez as a model,
the question I would like to examine is how PPT can contribute to
our understanding of the ways in which Congress might respond to
the Supreme Court in the constitutional realm.
Another reason PPT may have been applied more frequently to
judicial understanding of the legislative process is that its application in this way seems so novel. Among other things, PPT suggests
that courts intentionally adopt interpretations of statutes that are
unlikely to be overridden by the legislature. Accordingly, much of
the literature explains judicial decisions as reaching an equilibrium
between judicial and congressional preferences. Such a strategic
view of judicial decisionmaking is quite untraditional, however.
Professors Eskridge and Frickey observe that "[t]o some lawthe notion that the Supreme Court engages in strategic
yers ....
behavior may be shocking."98 In contrast, no one would be
shocked to learn that Congress acts strategically vis-h-vis the
courts, at least in one sense." When Congress enacts statutes, the

L. REV. 1631, 1634 (1995).
96. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577
(1993); see also ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 5 (1992) (arguing for
an egalitarian conception of authority among the branches); Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION As POLITICAL PROCESS 3, 8 (1988) (emphasizing the
interaction of all three branches in constitutional interpretation as opposed to a monopoly
of the judiciary).
97. Frickey, supra note 6, at 708-09.
98. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 88, at 29.
99. See Gely & Spiller, supra note 91, at 47 ("That politicians have preferences over
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members know that the legislation is subject to judicial review. If
members of Congress do not want their handiwork rejected, they
must take some care to ensure, as best as possible, that the legislation stays within bounds set by the courts. Rare would be the
purist lawyer or legislator who thinks that Congress either does, or
should, assess the constitutional question independent of judicial
pronouncements and let the chips fall where they may.' Thus,
our common understanding of congressional activity already is
strategic in somewhat the fashion that PPT would suggest.
Nonetheless, the perspective of PPT can teach us to read cases
better or at least differently. It is true that the typical lawyer's
reading of a case is already strategic in the sense that cases are
read in order to predict the outcome of later cases. In making this
prediction, the well-schooled reader will pay attention to the language of the majority opinion, take a head count of the Justices,
and predict their likely position in a later case. However, this only
demonstrates that the rough intuitions of skilled lawyers are consistent with many of the lessons of PPT. Indeed, the fact that
lawyers read cases strategically suggests the value of PPT because
such strategic reading often is inconsistent with a more formal
view of law, for example a view that distinguishes between holding
and dicta. Thus, lawyers intuitively understand and apply the lessons of PPT. But, closer attention to PPT will lead to a reading of
cases that emphasizes separate opinions of the Justices in different
ways and that causes opinions to be read with a different eye.
A.

PPT and the Reading of Cases

The central contribution of PPT transferable to the reading of
cases comes from the literature on judicial interpretation of legislative history. In essence, that literature says that in order for the
Supreme Court to ensure its statutory decisions are not overridden
by Congress, the Court must identify the preferences of Congress.' ' PPT offers ways to read the legislative record in order to
identify meaningful indicators of congressional preference." ° In
particular aspects of policies is not surprising."). Gely and Spiller also argue that the Supreme Court has policy preferences. Id. at 46.
100. Indeed, Franklin Roosevelt created quite a stir when he suggested that Congress do
just that. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (11th ed. 1985) (describing
Roosevelt's suggestion that Congress proceed with legislation, notwithstanding "doubts as
to constitutionality").
101. See supra note 89 (discussing the interaction of government branches in the con-

text of statutory interpretation).
102. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining PPT's presumption that insti-
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this way, the PPT literature is valuable to explain strategic behavior by the Supreme Court, and also to aid the courts in the more
traditional practice of ascertaining legislative intent. In either event,
PPT suggests that in interpreting the legislative record, courts must
separate the "pivotal" voters from the legislative body as a whole,
distinguish "cheap talk" from "sincere statements" and then read
those statements for the "signals" they contain.' Each of these
concepts is also important to the reading of cases, although-given
the very different institutional environments-the concepts mean
somewhat different things.
Because of the nature of Supreme Court decisionmaking, the
concept of the pivotal voter is far simpler than in the legislative
context. Several authors have discussed the legislative process as
containing a number of "veto gates," at which principal players
have the ability to advance or forestall legislation."' In the context of Supreme Court decisionmaking, there are only two such
junctures, one at the granting of certiorari to hear a case and the
other at the decision on the merits. Although the interplay between
the two can be important, the merits decision is the critical juncture. This is simply because it takes five votes to decide a case on
the merits and only four to grant a writ of certiorari. Identifying
pivotal votes at the merits stage is relatively simple. One need only
string out the Justices along a continuum, determining which votes
are relatively strong or weak for the proposition under consideration. Those close to the five vote decision point are going to be
pivotal.
Distinguishing cheap talk from sincere statements provides
further insight into the reading of cases. In the realm of interpreting legislative history, courts need to read the record with care
because opportunities for strategic behavior are rife. Thus, PPT
counsels distinguishing cheap talk from sincere statements. Sincere
statements are more likely made in situations where speakers may

tutions have policy preferences and seek to advance them).
103. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 90, at 7, 16-21, 25-29; McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 90, at 725-27. See also Farber & Frickey, supra note 87, at 47374 (recognizing the use of median voter models by PPT theorists that provide more stable
outcomes than multidimensional models and avoid the incoherence problem posed by
Arrow's Theorem).
104. See, e.g., McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 90, at 7, 16-21 (arguing that
by following the legislative path of a bill, an observer can identify the implicit elements
of the agreement); see also McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra note 90, at 707-08 (referring to a "sequence of veto points through which a statute must pass").
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be held accountable for displaying insincere preferences." Although the judicial arena is quite different, parallel principles apply.
Their application suggests a valuing of judicial opinions that is a
bit the reverse from traditional readings.
For one thing, a search for sincere indicators would suggest
discounting the language in majority opinions somewhat, while
valuing more highly the separate opinions of individual Justices. In
the traditional reading of cases, the majority opinion is seen as a
good indicator of the views of a majority, and such opinions appropriately are viewed as carrying great weight. They are the law.
However, a Justice writing for the majority of the Supreme Court
often has to hedge and fill to obtain the necessary votes. Drafting
to satisfy enough Justices to make a majority often yields a decision that is not wholly indicative of all the Justices' views, especially when there is some institutional compulsion to join the majority opinion."° A majority opinion may not reveal which votes
might easily switch under the different circumstances of the next
case. The majority opinion may indicate the preferences of its
author, but even here, care must be taken to assess whether the
author's views were modified to pick up the necessary votes."
In short, the majority opinion may be closer to the views of the
median, rather than pivotal, members of the Supreme Court.
Admittedly, stare decisis somewhat mitigates these concerns.
Stare decisis is a rule of precommitment, giving binding effect to
the compromises represented by majority opinions. One must be
candid about the "rule" of stare decisis, however. The binding
effect of any decision is the function of an individual Justice's
commitment to stare decisis in constitutional cases and the similarity between two cases (or a Justice's view of the similarity of two

105. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 90, at 21-29 (arguing that cheap talk
results when legislators are not held accountable); McNollgast, Positive Canons, supra
note 90, at 726 (discussing incentives for legislative participants to act sincerely).
106. Cf. Robert H. Jackson, The Law Is a Rule for Men to Live By, 9 VrrAL SPaEcHas
OF THE DAY 664, 665 (1943) ("Dissenting opinions . . . have a way of better pleasing
those who read as well as those who write them. They are apt to be more individual and
colorful. Opinions which must meet the ideas of many minds may in comparison seem
dull and undistinguished.").
107. This suggests that the larger the majority, the more sincere the opinion might be.
However, this is not necessarily the case; the majority opinion author still might have
traded off language to buy more votes. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 43-44 (1979)
(discussing how Chief Justice Earl Warren drafted Brown v. Board of Education in order
to obtain unanimity).
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The binding effect of stare decisis can easily be overstatcases).
108
ed.
For these reasons, separate opinions may deserve greater weight
than they would receive under a traditional reading. Because no
Justice is compelled to write, separate opinions are likely to be
quite sincere statements of the views of individual Justices, and to
some extent those that join them. Separate opinions are properly
viewed as statements made precisely to offer an individual explanation for joining or not joining the majority. Similarly, because there
is no need for a certain number of concurring or dissenting votes,
no Justice is compelled in this sense to join another's statement."
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of reading judicial decisions
is in locating and interpreting the signals that reveal judicial preferences. In a traditional reading of cases, valuable signals are found
by separating the holding from dicta. The holding, or at least what
a separate opinion would hold, is seen as central. For reasons that
will be apparent momentarily, this distinction has some real meaning even under a positive political approach. But most readers of
decisions understand that even the dicta carries some weight as a
"road map" of the author's views regarding other cases."' Thus,
the dicta in a decision regularly is deemed important to the understanding of governing legal principles.
Something is necessary, however, beyond the simple reading of
a decision, as lawyers do, even when dicta is taken into account.
Lawyers tend to overread or underread decisions. On the one hand,
they read for doctrinal formulas and then simply apply those formulas to predict the outcome of the next case. On the other hand,
lawyers tend to glean a great deal from supposed ideological preferences of Justices, assuming that in one type of case a given
Justice will predictably vote a certain way. What lawyers seldom
discuss is what bothered a Justice about a specific case, or why a

108. Indeed, in a recent article, McNollgast argues explicitly that stare decisis is a function of the pursuit of "personal policy objectives." McNollgast, supra note 95, at 1668;
see also Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1997, 2050 (1994)
("It could be argued that precedent is always a matter of degree."); Michael J. Gerhardt,
The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 68, 76 (1991) (discussing inconsistency in Justices' "standards or reasons for overruling precedents").
109. Nonetheless, similar to logrolling in the legislative arena, for a variety of reasons
Justices might seek support for their own opinions by signing on to those of others.
110. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 88, at 39-40.

1996]

LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND JUDICIAL SIGNALS

783

Justice felt compelled to join one opinion. However, the critical
question ought to be what the opinion in one case reveals about a
Justice's preferences and how that might be important in a subsequent case. The proposition is that judges do send very clear preferential signals, but understanding them requires focusing on different parts of an opinion than often catch lawyers' eyes and upon
reading those opinions in a different way.
All of this is complicated by the difficulty in identifying the
motivations of judges. Political policymakers like the President and
members of Congress are assumed to be motivated by ideology or
by a desire for reelection."' Identifying the motivation of judges
has proven difficult because the latter is so important in the political arena and because federal judges do not stand for reelection. "2 John Ferejohn, Richard Posner, and Daniel Rodriguez,
among others, have discussed the interpretive background against
which judges work."3 Judges likely have ideological preferences," 4 a point some even question,"' but they also have institutional preferences that may enhance or weaken the strength of
these ideological preferences. Common examples are a concern for
a coherent body of doctrine or adherence to the principle of stare
decisis." 6 Moreover, judges may be lazy and seek to reduce their
workload or simply may desire popularity. "' Factoring in these
preferences makes the act of prediction much harder for judges
than for legislators, in part because one case cannot yield a full
glimpse of any judge's utility function." 8
Finally, as Professors Eskridge and Frickey acknowledge, the
interaction, or dialogue, that occurs between Congress and the

111. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
112. Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public
Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 183, 221 (1991).
113. See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 109-43 (1995); Beermann, supra note
112, at 221-23; Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 91-105.
114. Gely & Spiller, supra note 91, at 47 ("the source of the preferences of the Supreme Court is basically ideological"); McNollgast, supra note 95, at 1667. McNollgast
argues that "larger, socially valuable goals, such as the respect for precedent and the rule
of law, are a by-product of the more narrow and limited goals of pursuing personal policy objectives." Id. at 1668.
115. E.g., Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 177 (1988) (arguing that
motivations of governmental institutions are far too mixed to be understood through generalizations).
116. Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 104.
117. POSNER, supra note 113, at 115, 117; Beermann, supra note 112, at 223.
118. For a notable attempt, factoring in leisure time, popularity, pecuniary remuneration
and voting, among other things, see POSNER, supra note 113, at 135-44.
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Supreme Court is both cooperative and competitive." 9 Reading
the signals provided by the Justices requires, at the first level, an
intuition about what is being communicated. When courts are being
cooperative they likely are dropping hints about what path Congress might pursue. But at times the Justices may be bluffing; a
warning stoutly given may evaporate in the face of congressional
insistence. In a sense, this simply reflects the inherent tension between the deference due to coordinate branches and the imposition
of judicial preferences, a tension Lopez reflects.
These then are the tools from PPT. By way of illustration, I
apply them to read Lopez. The question provoked by any reading
of Lopez is whether the decision represents a deviation from the
existing body of Supreme Court pronouncements as to the scope of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, and if so, what
does that deviation portend? What follows is not just an abstract
reading of Lopez, but one framed against pending congressional
legislation. That legislation is the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1995.
B.

The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1995

The political response to Lopez was swift. Although many in
the media focused on the broad impact of the Lopez ruling, a large
number of those in the political realm concentrated narrowly on
guns in schools. Several legislators vowed to revisit the problem." ° The President of the United States spoke out against the
evil of guns in schools and immediately directed the Attorney
General to examine ways in which Congress might assert its authority constitutionally.'

119. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 88, at 40-41 (predicting "both sincere signals and
bluffs" in the bargaining process).
120. For instance, Senator Herbert Kohl, the Democratic sponsor of the 1990 Act, promised immediately to reintroduce the Act in a form that the Court would uphold. John M.
Broder, President Blasts Ruling on Firearms, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at A14. Other
lawmakers in both parties were quick to express their concern over Lopez and their desire
to rewrite the 1990 Act as well. See Joan Biskupic, Ruling Puts Brakes on Congress's
Regulation, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 30, 1995, at J7. Senator Arlen Specter
responded by asking, "What comes next, drugs?... I think that crime is a national
problem. . . . Guns and drugs are the principal instrumentalities of crime." Id.
121. See PROPOSED LEGISLATION: "THE GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES AMENDMENTS AcT
OF 1995," H.R. Doc. NO. 72, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1995) (message from President

Clinton to Congress on May 10, 1995, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to
amend the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 to provide the necessary nexus with interstate commerce).
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Following Lopez, three options for repairing the 1990 Act
existed. First, Congress could reenact the same statute, but preface
it with legislative findings, and create a record to clarify that it
was regulating commerce. Second, Congress might pass the same
statute, but include a requirement that the possession of the gun
have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce (the "substantial
effect" nexus). Finally, Congress could include a requirement that
the gun possessed in the school zone have traveled in interstate
commerce (the "once traveled in interstate commerce" nexus). No
one option is exclusive of the others, and as it happens, Congress
has all three under consideration." Under the direction of the
President, the Attorney General recommended legislation that contained both of the nexus ideas." Such legislation has been intro-5
24 and in the Senate.2
duced in the House of Representatives'
The Senate legislation not only contains the two nexus provisions,"M but also is accompanied by extensive findings.'27

122. Although, oddly enough, the "substantial effect" nexus is only an "effect" nexus in
the statutes under consideration: there is no requirement that the possession of firearms in
or around schools have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, only that such possession "affects" interstate commerce. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
123. See PROPOSED LEGISLATnON: "THE GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES AMENDMENTS ACT
OF 1995," supra note 121, at 1, 3. (The legislation recommended by Attorney General
Reno amends § 922(q)(2)(A) of the 1990 Act "by inserting after 'zone' the following:
', if that firearm has moved in or the possession of such firearm otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce.").
124. On May 10, 1995, Rep. Schumer introduced H.R. 1608, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (amending paragraphs (2)(A) and (3)(A) of § 922(q), as amended by section
320904 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, "by inserting
'that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce,' after 'firearm'."),.
125. On June 7, 1995, Senator Kohl introduced the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1995, S. 890, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
126. Like H.R. 1608, S. 890 amends § 922(q) by inserting the following after "firearm"
in paragraphs 2(A) and 3(A): "that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or
foreign commerce." S. 890, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1995).
127. The extensive findings were previously enacted under § 320904 of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 which amended § 922(q)-the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990-to include congressional findings establishing a nexus between
guns and schools and interstate commerce:
(1) The Congress finds and declares that(A) crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, nationwide problem;
(B) crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of drugs, guns, and criminal gangs;
(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and
have been found in increasing numbers in and around schools, as documented
in numerous hearings in both the Judiciary Committee of the House of Repre-
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It is impossible to know, of course, if introduction of the 1995
Act signals a sincere interest in Congress to actually enact it. It is
quite possible that mere introduction of the legislation serves the
electioneering goals of the relevant parties. Hearings have been
held at least twice in the Senate on the proposed legislation,"a
providing even further publicity to the sponsors. There may not be
widespread support either for passage of the law or for confronting
the Supreme Court in this way. Indeed, the Lopez decision may be
strategically useful because the Supreme Court can be cast as
scapegoat for Congress's failure to enact the legislation, taking
Congress off the hook if it chooses to do nothing.
Whatever the fate of the 1995 Act in Congress, there are lessons to be learned from examining whether the Supreme Court
likely would uphold it. First, the judicial/legislative interaction
provides an illustration of the application of PPT to the reading of
constitutional decisions. Second, discussion of this particular legislation yields some insight into the broader impact of Lopez.
Before proceeding to apply the lessons of PPT to an examination of Lopez, it is useful to identify precisely what is at stake.
Even a lawyer's reading of Lopez suggests that some of the fixes
sentatives and the Judiciary Committee of the Senate;
(D) in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component
parts, ammunition, and the raw materials from which they are made have considerably moved in interstate commerce;
(E) while criminals freely move from State to State, ordinary citizens
and foreign visitors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the country due to concern about violent crime and gun violence, and parents may
decline to send their children to school for the same reason;
(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a
decline in the quality of education in our country;
(G) this decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on
interstate commerce and the foreign commerce of the United States;
(H) States, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to
handle gun-related crime by themselves; even States, localities, and school systems that have made strong efforts to prevent, detect, and punish gun-related
crime find their efforts unavailing due in part to the failure or inability of
other States or localities to take strong measures; and
(1) Congress has power, under the interstate commerce clause and
other provisions of the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the other
provisions of the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the integrity and
safety of the Nation's schools by enactment of this subsection.
Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125-26 (1994).
128. See, e.g., Guns in Schools-A Federal Role?: Hearing on S. 890 Before the
Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995). At this hearing, which I attended, the witnesses did not attempt to establish on
the record the connection between guns near schools and interstate commerce.
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in the 1995 Act have no realistic chance of success. For example,
the Senate Bill, finding a toehold in the Court's comment that
findings might be important, incorporates a long list of findings in
an effort to establish that commerce is being regulated. In light of
the discussion above, however, it seems apparent that the findings
will not be persuasive to the Supreme Court. 29 The 1995 Act's
findings are identical to the post hoe findings to which the Court
paid no attention when it had the opportunity.
Similarly unlikely to succeed in shifting the balance toward
constitutionality is the substantial effect nexus. Both the House and
Senate bills would criminalize guns in schools if the possession
"otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce."'30 Leaving to
one side the obvious failure to require a substantial effect, such a
nexus has limited utility. If Congress's view is that any gun possession near a school affects interstate commerce, the Lopez Court
already has rejected the contention unequivocally.' The alternative is that Congress intended to leave it open in any individual
case for the United States Attorney to prove the substantial effect.
While this is legally unobjectionable, the case-by-case burden lessens the utility of the statute.
The important battle, therefore, is over the "once traveled in
interstate commerce" nexus. This nexus rests on the seminal case
of Champion v. Ames,' in which the Supreme Court upheld the
power of Congress to ban the transportation of lottery tickets in
interstate commerce. The constitutional validity of the nexus finds
initial support in the Lopez decision. One of the categories that the
Court said might be regulated by Congress was the "use of the
channels of interstate commerce."''
The once traveled in interstate commerce nexus goes one step further than Champion, however, not by banning guns from traveling in interstate commerce,

129. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
130. H.R. 1608, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 890, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
see also supra notes 124, 126.
131. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is
in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially
affect any sort of interstate commerce."). In addition, the Court concluded the following:
"Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce'
or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms. . . . It
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise
out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce." (footnote omitted). Id. at 1630-31.
132. The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
133. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
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but by regulating an activity in which they are used after they
have traveled in commerce. Upholding the 1995 Act's validity
essentially would mean that Congress may regulate any activity if
any of its components has ever traveled in interstate commerce.
This aspect of Congress's power is up for grabs after Lopez. The
key question after Lopez is whether the Supreme Court is prepared
to uphold commerce legislation based solely on the "once traveled
in interstate commerce" nexus. This is a question squarely put by
the 1995 Act. The correct answer to the question is a matter of
sharp debate.
C. A Positive Political Reading of Lopez
A doctrinal, or traditional, reading of Lopez identifies support
in the decision for all of the techniques Congress adopted in framing the 1995 Act, but particularly for the once traveled in commerce nexus. A traditional reading of the Lopez decision would
identify numerous points that appear to support the legitimacy of
this modification of the statute. Discussing a prior precedent, United States v. Bass,3 ' the Lopez Court stated that the 1990 Act
"contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through
case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
'
interstate commerce."135
Although this might be ambiguous as to
which nexus was under discussion, the Court's use of the disjunctive in its conclusion of the discussion left no doubt. "Unlike the
statute in Bass, [the 1990 Act] has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect
on interstate commerce."' 36 Moreover, the opinion suggests that if
the gun or Lopez recently had moved in commerce previously, the
statute would have been valid: "Respondent was a local student at
a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in
interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession
of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.' 37

134. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
135. 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 1634. Similar suggestions are found in Justice Kennedy's concurrence:
"[N]either the actors nor their conduct have a commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the design of the statute have an evident commercial nexus." Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J.,concurring). "Absent a stronger connection or identification with commercial
concerns that are central to the Commerce Clause, that interference contradicts the federal
balance the Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to enforce." Id. at 1642
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Despite the appearance created by a lawyer's reading of Lopez,
a positive political reading of the same case creates quite a different impression. Proceeding to that reading involves three steps.
First, there is identification of the pivotal votes. Second, there is
the related assessment of the extent to which any opinion reflects
sincere preferences. Finally, there is the reading of signals in the
decisions as to what is really at stake for each Justice.
Identifying the pivotal voters on commerce issues after Lopez
is relatively easy. Four Justices voted in dissent, and none of them
is likely to come over to the other side if the 1995 Act is at issue.
The likeliest candidate would have been Justice Souter, given his
widely expressed views of adherence to stare decisis'3 However,
he was an extraordinarily firm vote on the 1990 Act, and the 1995
Act is distinguishable in ways he clearly would seize upon in
remaining with the dissent. Five Justices voted in the majority, one
of whom must be pried away to change the result in the case.
Justice Thomas is not even a remote possibility; his concurrence
basically calls for a pre-New Deal understanding of the commerce
power."' 9 That leaves us with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy.
Three of these four Justices are on record in Lopez, while one
is silent. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. The
prior discussion suggests that overcrediting the majority view may
be a mistake."4 Nonetheless, given the Chief Justice's strong
views in favor of state autonomy 4' and the fact that we are hunting for a breakaway vote, it would be surprising to learn that the
majority decision is less favorable to Congress's power than

(Kennedy, J., concurring).
138. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (Joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("Within the bounds of normal stare decisis analysis,
then, and subject to the considerations on which it customarily turns, the stronger argument is for affirming Roe's central holding, with whatever degree of personal reluctance
any of us may have, not for overruling it.").
139. See 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J.,concurring) ("In a future case, we ought to
temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our
more recent case law and is more faithful to the original understanding of that Clause.").
140. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579-80
(1985); see also id. at 581 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting) (expressing such a view and predicting that the National League of Cities principle would "in time again command the support of a majority of this Court"); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852
(1976) (Rehnquist, J.). But see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987)
(Rehnquist, CJ.) (holding that the Tenth Amendment does not necessarily limit conditions
that may be placed on federal grants to state and local governments).
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Rehnquist would vote alone. Justice Kennedy concurred separately,
joined by Justice O'Connor. Only Justice Scalia silently joined the
majority opinion.
Assuming that the majority decision authored by the Chief
Justice is sincere, the question is what signal was he sending? We
have already seen how a traditional lawyer's reading of Lopez
would find support in that decision for the once traveled in interstate commerce nexus, but that reading would be a serious mistake.
The trick is to read the Lopez majority decision while asking the
following question: what is bothering the Chief Justice? Reading
the decision with this question in mind reveals a plain answer.
The Chief Justice is concerned that to uphold the 1990 Act is
to take a trip down the slippery slope, leaving no limits on
Congress's power to regulate in the name of interstate commerce.
His decision "start[s] with first principles. The Constitution creates
a Federal Government of enumerated powers."' 42 After probing
this point he turns to the case law, describing the now discredited
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States143 decision.
"[T]he justification for the formal distinction was rooted in the fear
that otherwise 'there would be virtually no limit to the federal
power and for all practical purposes we should have a completely
centralized government."" ' Rehnquist concludes his discussion of
case law with the concern that commerce not be defined so as to
"'obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government."" '4 5 The
concern that the Government's and Justice Breyer's positions lack
any real limits'" prompts the Chief Justice to conclude that "[t]o
uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States."'47
It is difficult to see how concerns about the slippery slope are
ameliorated by inclusion of the once traveled in interstate commerce nexus. In a superficial way, perhaps they are. After all,
142. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
143. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
144. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628 (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 1629 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937)).
146. Id. at 1633 (expressing concern that those positions would allow Congress to regulate in such traditionally local areas as family law and education).
147. Id. at 1634.
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family law and education might still remain sacrosanct. Or would
they? In today's world, it is extraordinarily difficult to identify
anything that has not traveled in interstate commerce, and it is
equally difficult to identify any conduct Congress might regulate
that does not involve goods or persons that have traveled in interstate commerce. For example, Congress might prohibit divorce if
either party has traveled in or is going to travel in interstate commerce. In today's integrated economy, pressing the constitutionality
of a federal ban in schools based on the fact that a gun traveled,
perhaps thirty years ago, in interstate commerce is unlikely to
address the Chief Justice's real concerns and win his vote.14
This conclusion also seems to be correct for either or both of
the Justices who signed Justice Kennedy's opinion, albeit for different reasons. The concern of the concurrence is not the slippery
slope but the preservation of a sphere of autonomy for state experimentation. In addition, the separate opinion is a strong statement in
favor of judicial review. It is unclear whether this results in a view
that traditional state functions like education cannot be regulated or
only that they may not be regulated in a manner that forecloses
experimentation. In either event, addition of the once traveled in
interstate commerce nexus is unlikely to be very persuasive to the
concurring Justices.
The Kennedy concurrence admittedly is a bit odd because it
starts off appearing to head in one direction but ends in another. It
begins as a strong statement about the difficulty of applying "content-based or subject-matter distinctions, thus defining by semantic
or formalistic categories those activities that were commerce and
those that were not."149 This portion of the opinion also addresses
the dangers of applying formal distinctions to limit Congress's
power."1 Then, mid-way through, the opinion seems to turn on
its head. First, there is a paean to federalism as a safeguard of
liberty. 5 ' This is followed by an extremely strong iteration of the
view that if the political branches will not restrain themselves, the
courts will do it for them. 2 Ultimately, the concurrence con-

148. Dan Farber points out that perhaps the "once traveled in commerce" nexus would
appease the Chief Justice, simply because it provides for some role for judicial review.
149. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1635 (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
150. See id. at 1635-37; see also id. at 1638 ("[Mlathematical or rigid formulas . . .
are not provided by the great concepts of the Constitution.").
151. See id. at 1638-39 ("[Flederalism was the unique contribution of the Framers to
political science and political theory.").
152. See id. at 1639-40 (stressing the importance of judicial review).
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cludes that the statute is invalid because "neither the actors nor
their conduct have a commercial character, and neither the purposes
nor the design of the statute have an evident commercial nexus."'1 53 What makes the statute even more troublesome, according
to the concurrence, is that it intrudes into a "traditional concern of
the States.' ' 54 This hardly seems the same decision that began by
rejecting formal considerations. 5
One reason for the opinion's odd turn may be that it was jointly authored, suggesting that if there is a wedge in the five vote
majority, this is a likely spot. There is precedent for Justices Kennedy and O'Connor jointly authoring decisions.'56 Although Justice Kennedy is the putative author, the latter half of the opinion,
beginning with the liberty-enhancing nature of federalism, sounds
very much like other O'Connor decisions, notably New York v.
United States,'57 Gregory v. Ashcroft,'58 and FERC v. Mississippi.'59 If this reading is correct, Justice Kennedy may be a loose
vote.
Whatever the case about loose votes, the key to the opinion,
the signal, seems to come at the end. Leaving general talk behind,
the concurrence emphasizes that education is a traditional state
function.'' The opinion then stresses that over forty states have
their own laws criminalizing guns in or near schools. 6 Perhaps
more importantly, the opinion reviews alternative approaches employed by state and local governments to remove guns from
schools, such as fining parents, rewarding informers, encouraging
voluntary surrender, and suspending or expelling students. 63 The
1990 Act interfered with all this. "The statute now before us fore-

153. Id. at 1640.
154. Id. ("[lit is well established that education is a traditional concern of the States.").
155. Cf Fried, supra note 11, at 44 (suggesting that Kennedy's concurrence in Lopez
may turn out to be another National League of Cities).
156. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833-911 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
157. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 on grounds that parts of it violated the Tenth Amendment).
158. 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (upholding state statute requiring judges to retire at age 70).
159. 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding Congress's power to regulate public utilities, even
those that only operate in one state).
160. See Sullivan, supra note 12, at 105 (suggesting that Justice Kennedy is a swing
vote in federalism cases).
161. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1640 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
163. Id.
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closes the States from experimenting and exercising their own
judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history
and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the
realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that
,1
term. 6
Whoever the author of, or adherent to, this part of the opinion,
he, she, or they are unlikely to be impressed by the 1995 Act's
inclusion of the once traveled in interstate commerce nexus. Virtually all guns travel in interstate commerce or have done so at one
time. The nexus will not preserve the state and local sphere that
seems so important. Indeed, the irony is that the 1995 Act contains
a non-preemption clause, but that clause is telling, as is Justice
Breyer's conclusion that the 1990 Act did not displace state choices."6 In the sense of the concurrence, these state choices inevitably are displaced by the federal law. A voluntary surrender program, for example, is not likely to be effective if surrendering a
gun is legal under state law but subjects one to federal criminal
prosecution. The issue is not preemption for these Justices, it is
displacement.
Were there no more evidence than the Lopez decision itself,
this reading of Lopez would suggest that the Supreme Court might
not uphold the 1995 Act simply because of the addition of the
once traveled in interstate commerce nexus. The conclusion is not
a firm one, however. First, it is difficult to know where Justice
Scalia stands. Second, the odd Kennedy concurrence might suggest
Justice Kennedy himself could be swayed in the appropriate case.
Finally, the reading of Lopez fails to consider the additional values
that might influence the preferences of any Justice, such as adherence to stare decisis or an amount of deference to strongly stated
views of a coordinate branch.
Lopez is typical of many cases, however, in that additional
information almost always will exist that may fill out the impressions created by one decision. For example, to get a firm read on
any Justice, it might be necessary to canvass related decisions they
have joined, as well as decisions that reveal the strength of their
adherence to stare decisis, and like factors. Although canvassing all
or even most of the possible additional sources is beyond the scope

164. Id.
165. See id. at 1661 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("To hold this statute constitutional is not
to 'obliterate' the 'distinction of what is national and what is local,' . . . or to regulate
any and all aspects of education.").

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 46:757

of this paper, there are several pertinent sources that fill out the
picture in significant ways and that provide further insight into the
application of PPT to the reading of constitutional cases.
First, there is a precedent identified by other commentators as
relevant to the constitutionality of the once traveled in interstate
commerce nexus, but which would be unlikely to have significant
impact were the 1995 Act adopted.'" That precedent is
Scarborough v. United States,"7 in which the question was
whether Congress intended to criminalize possession of a gun by a
convicted felon simply because the gun once traveled in interstate
commerce.'68 Under a traditional reading, Scarborough is of potential importance because it could be "binding" precedent. But
even binding precedents might be swept away. The question from a
PPT perspective is how close the precedent really is and how firm
is an individual Justice's adherence to stare decisis. Both variables
must be taken into account in order to determine how binding a
precedent will be. A Justice who is not overly concerned with stare
decisis or preferring a different outcome will work to distinguish
prior precedent. A Justice who feels strongly about stare decisis
might feel bound by a precedent that is close, albeit not altogether
on point.
Even without mapping the preferences of the Justices as to
stare decisis, Scarborough likely will have little significance. The
Supreme Court did uphold the conviction of the prior felon for
possessing guns even though the guns had traveled several years
earlier in commerce.'69 But despite appearances, Scarborough is
of dubious relevance on the once traveled in interstate commerce
question. In any event, the decision contains so much room to

166. In addition to the precedents discussed here, see also Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding the federal loan sharking statute, relying heavily on congressional findings regarding an impact on interstate commerce) and United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336 (1971) (overturning conviction for violation of federal firearms statute on
grounds that statute did not draw a connection between firearm possession and interstate
commerce). I discount Perez because, as previously discussed, there were findings and a
record available in Lopez, had the Court cared to rely upon them. Bass is trickier because
the Lopez Court cited Bass to suggest a commerce nexus might suffice. See 115 S. CL at
1631. For the reasons described above, however, I believe this "traditional" reading leads
to an incorrect conclusion.
167. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
168. Id. at 564.
169. See id. at 577-78 ("Here, the intent of Congress is clear. . . . [Tihere is no question that Congress intended no more than a minimal nexus requirement. . . . [W]e affirm
the conviction of petitioner.").
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maneuver, it is unlikely to be binding to any Justice that is not

already ideologically predisposed to be bound. None of the Justices
in the Lopez majority sat on Scarborough.7 ' Further, the decision
plainly is framed as a question of statutory interpretation,' leaving any subsequent Court free to claim that the constitutional question had been left open. Moreover, to the extent the once traveled
in interstate commerce constitutional question was lurking, the
Court seemed to duck it intentionally by finding that the substantial
effect nexus would do in that case. 72 According to the Court,
possession of guns by convicted felons could be seen to have a
substantial effect on commerce. 173
Of greater relevance than Scarborough are some much older
decisions that seem to deal directly with the once traveled in interstate commerce nexus.'74 Chief among these is United States v.
Sullivan,75 in which a pharmacist was prosecuted for violating
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which prohibited misbranding a drug. Sullivan removed sulfathiazole pills from
a properly labeled container and sold small quantities of them in
an unbranded pillbox lacking statutorily required usage and
cantronany information.
The sale occurred nine months after

170. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens were on the Supreme Court at the time. Justice
Stevens joined the Scarborough majority, 431 U.S. at 563-78, but he dissented in Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1651. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in Scarborough, 431 U.S. at
578.
171. See Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 564 ('The issue in this case is whether proof that
the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the
statutorily required nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and
commerce." (emphasis added)).
172. See id. at 571-72 ("As we have previously observed, Congress is aware of the
'distinction between legislation limited to activities "in commerce" and an assertion of its
full Commerce Clause power so as to cover all activity substantially affecting interstate
commerce.' Indeed, that awareness was explicitly demonstrated here. . . . And we see no
basis for contending that a weapon acquired after a conviction affects commerce differently from one acquired before and retained." (citations omitted)).
173. Id. at 572-73.
174. See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (upholding Congress's power to
ban retail pharmacists' relabeling of drugs that have been shipped in interstate commerce
with correct labels); Weigle v. Curtice Bros. Co., 248 U.S. 285 (1919) (upholding a Wisconsin statute prohibiting resale of certain food removed from its original packaging after
moving in interstate commerce and then held for sale on the ground that it did not interfere with the 1906 Food and Drug Act); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913)
(upholding congressionally authorized regulation requiring the seizure of mislabeled goods
shipped in interstate commerce).
175. 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
176. Id. at 691-92.
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the interstate transportation of the pills had ceased." Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court
upheld the conviction against a Commerce
7
Clause challenge.1 1
Although Sullivan and related cases may or may not bear directly upon the question raised by the 1995 Act, the important
point to bear in mind about these cases, from a PPT perspective, is
their age and how that might relate to the factors that motivated
Lopez. A case like Sullivan might be distinguished from Lopez, in
that the very purpose of the branding requirement is defeated if a
sale such as Sullivan's is not covered. But, what is important is
that the Lopez Court might distinguish such a case simply because
the dynamic has changed so much since 1948, when Sullivan was
decided. PPT would suggest that precedents such as Sullivan are
strongest when the congressional coalition that passed the statutes
is still in place. The makeup of Congress has changed recently
with regard to federalism questions. In light of this and of the age
of Sullivan and Scarborough, the Supreme Court might feel comfortable distinguishing or overruling these older precedents. It is
noteworthy that neither decision was cited in the majority opinion
in Lopez.
Lopez cannot be fully understood, as Professor Sara Sun
Beale 7 1 makes plain, without taking into account the context in
which the decision was rendered. Members of the judiciary have
joined lately in expressing concern about the increasing federalization of criminal offenses and the impact of that federalization on
the dockets of federal courts. Chief Justice Rehnquist and other
members of the Court have expressed such concern in extra-judicial
statements.' The Long Range Plan of the Judicial Conference of
the United States'81 raises such concern as one of the most pressing issues facing the judiciary. Present concern about federalization
may well work to move the Supreme Court to read prior decisions
quite narrowly or to overrule them.

177. Id. at 692.
178. Id. at 697-98 (rejecting the Fifth Circuit's narrow construction of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, on the ground, among others, that the Act was a proper exercise of Congress's commerce power based on a comparison of Sullivan and
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913)).
179. Professor Sara Sun Beale, Address at the Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium The New Federalism after United States v. Lopez (Nov. 10, 1995).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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Indeed, in this context, one interesting piece of evidence is
several cases in which the Court denied certiorari after the Lopez
decision,' or in one case simply issued a short per curiam opinion.' Technically speaking, all of these cases involved a question different than the question raised by the once traveled in interstate commerce nexus." 4 Ramey and Moore involved convictions
under, inter alia, the federal arson statute. These were "affecting
commerce" cases; the only nexus to commerce was that the structure burned had used electricity or gas from an interstate grid.8 5
Robertson was a case arising under the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act.'86 At issue was whether the investment of criminal proceeds in a gold mine, which was engaged
in commerce, met the statutory "engaged in" requirement." Although the ties were slight, the Court found in its per curiam
opinion that the mine received supplies and equipment in commerce and some of the gold from the mine also entered interstate
commerce.'
Although, strictly speaking, these actions by the
Court suggest a narrow interpretation of Lopez, at least insofar as
the affecting commerce part of the decision goes, it is unwise to
ascribe any particular motive to the denial of certiorari. Justice

182. See, e.g., Ramey v. United States, 24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1838 (1995); Moore v. United States, No. 93-5273, 1994 WL 251174 (4th Cir.
June 10, 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995).
183. See United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995) (per curiam).
184. Despite the denials of certiorari in Ramey and Moore, the Supreme Court may be
confronted with the "substantial effect" question shortly. In United States v.
Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit invalidated a conviction under the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), on the ground that the building
destroyed had only "a remote and indirect effect on interstate commerce," thus rejecting
the government's argument that it was enough that the private home received natural gas
from out-of-state sources. 64 F.3d at 528. Because the Ninth Circuit ruled against the
government, the Supreme Court might-if asked-take the case.
185. See Ramey, 24 F.3d at 607 (finding the burned trailer had received electricity from
an interstate power grid); Moore, 1994 WL 251174, at *3 (finding the burned house was
connected to interstate gas lines).
186. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. V). Robertson allegedly violated a provision of the RICO Act that prohibits the investment of proceeds obtained through illegal
activities in the "acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." Id. § 1962(a).
187. 115 S. Ct. at 1733. However, the Court clearly stated that it would not consider
whether the activities of the gold mine "affected" interstate commerce. "Whether or not
these activities met. . . the requirement of substantially affecting interstate commerce,
they assuredly brought the gold mine within § 1962(a)'s alternative criterion of 'any enterprise . . . engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce."' Id.
188. Id.
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Scalia's dissents from the denials of certiorari in Ramey and
Moore, however, suggest he is not a weak adherent to Lopez,
thereby strengthening the force of that decision.
The truly interesting question, however, is whether the Supreme
Court, having made its views known in Lopez, simply is biding its
time, watching to see what a very different Congress might do
with regard to new legislation. Between the time Congress passed
the post hoc findings ignored in Lopez and the Lopez decision
itself, Congress dramatically shifted into Republican hands. A good
part of the Contract With America, upon which the Republicans
ran, rests on notions of greater respect for federalism and devolution of power from the national government to the States." 9 That
change in power and perspective having taken place, the members
of the Lopez majority may be taking a wait-and-see attitude, declining to strike down more laws if Congress seems to have gotten
the message. Indeed, for this very reason, one might be skeptical
that the 1995 Act would ever become law. The 1990 Act was
adopted by a Democratic Congress and signed by a very reluctant
The 1995 Act was introduced in the
Republican President.'
House at the behest of a Democratic President and in the Senate
by one of the original Democratic sponsors of the 1990 Act. The
same dynamic upon which the Court is banking may prevent passage of the 1995 Act. For the very same reason, the Supreme
Court may have been emboldened in handing down its Lopez decision by the existence of the Republican Congress. As I indicated
earlier, the institutional interaction is both competitive and cooperative. 9' Because Lopez was handed down after the pro-federalism
Congress was elected, the Court might have felt safer moving to
the right in the tenor of its decision. Although Congress cannot
technically overrule a Supreme Court constitutional decision, it
could generate heat for the Court by forcing a showdown. If the
composition of Congress were to change again, it is less clear how
firm the Court would be in sticking to Lopez. 92

189. Professor Tushnet makes just this point. See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment, 46 CASE WES. L. REV. 845, 845 (1996).
190. See Statement by President George Bush On Signing the Crime Control Act of
1990, supra note 52, at 1945 ("Most egregiously, section 1702 inappropriately overrides
legitimate State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law.").
191. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
192. See generally Gely & Spiller, supra note 91 (discussing impact on Supreme Court
constitutional decisionmaking of changes in composition of Congress).
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Nonetheless, this positive political reading of Lopez suggests
Congress ought to take seriously the Lopez decision. Lopez appears
to be the work of a Supreme Court that has grown increasingly
troubled by congressional expansion of its authority, particularly
when the expansion involves federalization of criminal conduct
typically dealt with under state law. Congress's power rests on
several doctrinal threads. One of them involves keeping the channels of commerce free from injurious goods. 93 But it is a stretch
from this position to the position that simply because an article
once traveled in commerce, Congress may regulate any activity
involving that article. The positive political reading of Lopez presented here suggests that stretch may be one the Supreme Court is
ready to eliminate and counsels against any congressional attempts
to push the point without a sincere belief that the national interest
requires it.
This interpretation of Lopez is, of course, tenuous given the
many factors that play into judicial preferences. One of those factors undoubtedly is, and should be, the extent to which the Supreme Court is confronted with a sincere Congress pushing the
scope of its authority where Congress believes national interests are
at stake. Even if the exercise of power is doubtful, a Justice may
well vote to affirm Congress's exercise if convinced of the importance of the national interests at stake. All this serves to underscore, however, the need for Congress to exercise the full reach of
its powers only when necessary and to justify doing so with an
ample record. That is why Professor Frickey's contribution of a
legislative record canon makes such great sense.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The legislative record canon advanced by Professor Frickey is a
good idea, but that canon had little role to play in Lopez. Rather,
Lopez was a strong statement by the Supreme Court that, whatever
the record might have been, it was unprepared to uphold the 1990
Act. The question remains exactly what that strong statement
means for future Commerce Clause legislation.

193. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)
authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from moral
or injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is also no longer open to question."'
(citations omitted)).
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PPT has much to add to our reading of constitutional cases.
Indeed, to the extent that the lessons of PPT already are incorporated in the reading of cases, this only reinforces PPT's value. But
close attention to the techniques of PPT, identification of pivotal
judicial voters, determination of which judicial language is sincere,
and assessment of the signals sent by the Justices can enhance our
understanding of a decision's scope. PPT suggests Lopez may have
a serious impact on future Commerce Clause doctrine. One of
Congress's doctrinal tools to regulate commerce has been the regulation of activities involving goods that once traveled in interstate
commerce. A positive political reading of Lopez suggests that, at
the very least, Congress should not take for granted that such a
nexus will satisfy the Supreme Court in future cases.

